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Santayana's Missing Pages: 
Learning by Recollecting How We Use Photographs 
 
 
To see what is in front of one's nose needs a constant struggle. 
 
George Orwell (1946)1 
 
… if cinema is committed to communicate only by way of what is real, it 
becomes all the more important to discern those elements in filming which 
confirm our sense of natural reality and those which destroy that feeling. 
 
Andre Bazin (1951)2 
 
No other medium of expression has the cinema's original and innate capacity for 
showing things, that we believe worth showing, as they happen day by day … . 
 
Cesare Zavattini (1967)3 
 
… you can't make films about things, you can only make films with things, with 
people, with light, with flowers, with mirrors, with blood ... 
 
Douglas Sirk [?]4 
 
1 George Orwell, 'In Front of Your Nose', Tribune, 22 March 1946, as cited by Michael 
Shelden on page 51 of his Orwell: the Authorised Biography (London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 
(1991). Sheldon took the quotation from Volume IV of the Collected Essays, Journalism and 
Letters of George Orwell, edited by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (London: Secker and Warburg, 
1968; New York, Harcourt, 1968). 
2 Andre Bazin, "Theatre and Cinema, Part Two", pages 95-124 of What is Cinema, 
Volume 1, translated by Hugh Grey (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California 
Press, 1967), page 110. 
3 Cesare Zavattini, Sequences from a Cinematic Life, translated and introduced by 
William Weaver (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1970 [original Italian 
edition, 1967]), page 220. 
4 As recalled in 1971 by Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Cited within an article entitled 
"'Douglas Sirk: From the Archives' by Manuel Betancourt, December 22, 2015" as reproduced on 
the website of Film Comment on 03 March 2019 [https://www.filmcomment.com/blog/sirk-
from-the-archives/]. Betancourt says that … "the 1972 edition of the Edinburgh Film Festival 
programmed a 20-film retrospective, which Sirk attended as a guest. … [The retrospective] led 
to the publication of a book of essays edited by Laura Mulvey and Jon Halliday. Featuring mostly 
new materials, the collection also reprinted a translated version of Fassbinder’s 1971 tribute to 
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Prologue 
 
In 1895 Louis Lumière stood on a quay within the railway station near his family home in 
La Ciotat in southern France awaiting the arrival of a train. Beside him stood a curious 
machine of his own construction, one of the first motion picture cameras. As the train 
pulled into the station, Lumière aimed his camera and turned the crank. The train rolled 
to a stop and the passengers disembarked, walking past the camera on their way into 
the depot. Finally, having exhausted his reel of film, Lumière stopped cranking the 
camera.  
 
Several months later, on 28 December 1895, thirty-five persons gathered in the  I in the 
basement of the Grand Café on the Boulevard des Capucines in Paris having purchased 
tickets to the first paid public screening of films within a 'cinema'. A roll of film printed in 
part from the strip exposed at the train station was placed inside the machine that had 
now been converted into a projector. The lights were dimmed, the projector's lamp was 
lit, the spectators gazed at a screen hung at the front of the room as a pianist begun to 
play, and the projectionist began to crank the projector. 
 
Within moments, the members of the audience, as the brothers Lumière had wished, 
were sharing what John Dewey would later celebrate as the kind of intensified 
experience that is symptomatic of artistic encounters. But how ought we to talk of their 
encounter? More precisely,  
 
What verb ought we to use when speaking of how the members of the audience 
encountered whatever they encountered that evening? 
 
After the screening, they spoke uniformly of having seen a train arriving at a quay within 
a station and passengers disembarking from it. How astonishing! For they had at the 
time been seated in a room in the basement of a Parisian café far from trains, quays, 
stations and passengers. 
 
Perhaps, then, they spoke inaccurately of their encounter having seen instead 
something in the room distinct from trains, quays, stations and passengers – the 
variably and intermittently illuminated surface of the screen suspended at the front of 
the room – and having, while seeing it, been induced into imagining, supposing, 
believing or otherwise thinking mistakenly that they were seeing a train arriving at a 
station. Had each of them, then, upon seeing the screen hanging before them, 
 
the German director whom he’d admired and emulated throughout his own work." The quoted 
phrase is from a paragraph in translation of Fassbinder's tribute that follows. 
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constructed unwittingly within themselves some kind of day dream, mirage, illusion, 
chimera, apparition or other fantasy, misconstruing its shimmering surface for a train, 
quay, station and passengers? How astonishing! For, if so, the members of the audience 
had fantasized with miraculous coincidence, as if a god had intervened to align their 
misapprehensions within a pre-established harmony sufficiently exact to enable them to 
converse thereafter about an event encompassing a train, quay, station and 
disembarking passengers that they had seemingly witnessed in common. Inexplicably, 
their fantasies could as well and in lock-step be re-induced simply by re-screening the 
film. And even more strangely, as the brothers Lumière recognised, the event of which 
they spoke of having seen with its train, quay, station and passengers was identical to 
the event that Louis Lumière had seen occurring before him as he cranked his camera 
months before in La Ciotat, as if the same god, discontented with aligning only the 
fantasies, had chosen to align them as well with an event within the world itself. 
 
How could the members of Lumiére's audience have been so misled, many of them 
technical adepts who, having heard of his invention, were keen to witness its effects and 
all of them competent speakers of a language within which they were accustomed to 
distinguishing the seeing of things such as trains, quays, stations and passengers from 
the imagining of them?  
 
With the advent of filmmaking, a gap widened that had for more than half-a-century 
divided those encountering things by means of photographs, separating photographers 
and their audiences who spoke in common of seeing things by means of photographs 
that could have otherwise been seen in the world (seeing them, but differently) from 
thinkers who believed themselves to be more attuned to the requisite resonances of 
philosophical discourse. How astonishing, yet again, that so many of the latter were to 
slip unwittingly down the slope of logical pretension into murky philosophical waters, 
sinking far over their heads, by begging the very questions they were supposedly 
addressing and especially so when the problems were methodological.5  
 
How, then, ought we to adjudicate between these multiple astonishments? How, that is, 
nearly two and a half millennia after Aristotle paved the way toward understanding the 
constraints upon philosophical method exemplified later by Collingwood, Austin and 
Wittgenstein, ought we to acknowledge the commonplace account of photographical 
encounters presumed by audiences and photographers (including filmmakers) then and 
now? Or are we called upon instead to replace it with an account of some other kind 
warranted – how? 
 
 
5 For more of this story, curious readers may wish to consult my essay "Filmmaking, 
Logic and the Historical Reconstruction of the World", Film & Philosophy II (1995), pages 88-104. 
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Working from within the historical saga of that query into method and its challenge to 
the scope and nature of philosophical enquiry itself, I wish to introduce you to a 
prescient example of how better to approach those problems – a commentary upon 
how and why we speak of having seen things by means of photographs made soon after 
the Lumière's screening by one of the most intriguing philosophers of the past century.  
 
 
The Story of Santayana's Story 
 
Sometime between 1900 and 1907 George Santayana gave an invited address to the 
Harvard Camera Club on the nature of photography. The talk was extraordinary even as 
measured against his encompassing interests and competences.6 
 
Although Santayana was already at work upon the first of the two multi-volume 
treatises of comprehensive philosophy that were to provoke later commentators to 
include him among the 'systematic philosophers', his address was intended to be 
understandable independently of them.7 For Santayana, unique among professional 
philosophers in being an accomplished poet, dramatist, essayist and (later) novelist and 
autobiographer was here speaking of the scope and limits of 'photography', an artistic 
endeavour of which he had by his own admission only an amateur's appreciation and 
that he assessed quite correctly as being as yet of only minimal artistic importance. 
 
6 No date appears on Santayana's handwritten copy of the address. Since the Harvard 
Camera Club existed only from 1900 to 1907, however, we can be assured that it was presented 
during the interval and probably earlier rather than later within it, for Santayana was the kind of 
luminary who might well have been invited to speak early on, and in the way he did, to a young 
club seeking in part to legitimate its activities. I am indebted to Irving Singer for having secured 
from the researchers of the Harvard University Archives the dates of the club's existence and for 
an e-mail to me of 8 February 2000 confirming them. 
 The manuscript of Santayana's address, entitled "The Photograph and the Mental 
Image", Columbia Manuscript Collection, XIV:5:a., was eventually published in an edition 
prepared by his literary executor, Daniel Cory, copyright 1967, as pages 391-403 of the 
anthology Animal Faith and Spiritual Life: Previously Unpublished and Uncollected Writings by 
George Santayana, edited by John Lachs (New York, New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967). 
Excerpts from this edition of his talk, never reissued, have been appended below. 
7 The Life of Reason was to be published in five volumes between 1905 and 1906; The 
Realms of Being was to appear in four volumes, the first published in 1927, the last in 1940. 
Santayana was to be counted among the 'systematic philosophers', for example, by Stuart 
Brown, Diané Collinson and Robert Wilkinson, editors of One Hundred Twentieth-Century 
Philosophers (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), page 178, in their categorisation preceding 
the short essay about him Robert Wilkinson.  
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Never again was he to address the subject of photography, and the text of his talk was 
to remain unpublished during his lifetime.8 
 
And yet, as Santayana suggested to his audience at the beginning of his talk, he 
considered the remarks that he was about to make to be "not without importance", a 
verdict confirmed by his having written them out beforehand in a "relatively polished" 
manuscript that he retained to be deposited among his papers at Columbia University, 
intact but for four concluding pages.9 
 
Santayana's estimation of the peculiar merit of what he had to say within his address 
was just, for it marked the first time that a significant philosopher, accomplished in 
other arts, was to distinguish photography from them. His talk was to consist of a 
commentary upon the simple yet astonishing fact that we use photographs and films 
and speak usefully of them as if we could by means of them see the objects and events 
that had occurred before the camera as the exposures were made. He was to conclude 
in consequence that working photographers and filmmakers, unlike other artists, ought 
to attend primarily to how the objects and events occurring before the camera look as 
exposure is made of them rather than to themselves or to their tools, for that is what 
we shall later encounter by means of them.  
 
Both the observation and the inference had served photographers as the fundamental 
working axiom of their craft for over half a century and were to remain so ever after as 
the craft of cinematography distinguished itself within the discipline. Santayana had 
articulated the primary constraint that must be understood if the distinctive power of 
the photographical arts are themselves to be understood two decades before Pudovkin 
was to build upon it the general theory of film design and nearly half a century before 
the echoes of Panofsky, Bazin, Kracauer and Cavell were to be heard.10 
 
8 'Photography' encompassed for Santayana the photographing of movies as well, as the 
second sentence of his talk confirms: "They fill our rooms, shops and journals; they even take 
the place of actors upon the stage, and repeat for us with the movement of life whatever 
interesting scenes are being enacted in any part of the world." (See page 13 of the Appendix to 
this essay.) I shall speak hereafter only of 'photography', as he did, avoiding the cumbersome 
interpolation of 'and filmmaking' wherever it might properly have been placed. 
9 The phrase "relatively polished" is an assessment of the editor, John Lachs, in his 
"Introduction" to the work as published. See page 3 of the volume cited in footnote 6.. 
10 See Vsevolod Pudovkin, Film Technique and Film Acting, translated and edited by Ivor 
Montagu (New York, New York: Bonanza Books, 1949). [Original of Film Technique published in 
Russian in 1926-27; English translation published by Victor Gollancz Ltd. (London, England) in 
October, 1929]. Erwin Panofsky, "Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures"; revision published 
in Critique, Vol. 1, No. 3, January – February 1947; original published in the Bulletin of the 
Department of Art and Archaeology (Princeton University, 1934). Andre Bazin, What is Cinema?, 
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Santayana's address would have been remarkable if only for its conclusions. I wish to 
concentrate here, however, upon a broader aspect of it – perhaps the most 
extraordinary of all – namely how Santayana approached the task of distinguishing 
photography from other arts, for how he did so anticipated how the least pretentious of 
later philosophers would reconstrue the task of philosophy itself, exemplifying indeed a 
profound correction of it. 
 
 
Santayana's Story 
 
Santayana, before pondering photography, had spent years learning by doing how to 
solve the kinds of problems that artists in other arts confront. Upon attending to 
photography, he was able therefore to sense a gap between the way in which 
photographers were working and the ways within which those working within other 
arts, himself included, had to work. How then, he asked himself, do the concerns of 
working photographers differ from those of other artists? How, indeed, ought they to 
differ? 
 
Many thinkers after Plato have presumed that such questions can be answered only 
after having determined how the kinds of things of which we are speaking are 
distinguished from other kinds of things ontologically or epistemologically. We must, 
they think, decide what kinds of things photographs are as distinct from others, or how 
we come distinctly to know of them, before we can begin to enquire after how we 
ought to think about making them. 
 
Santayana, however, wasted no time with such fanciful preliminaries. How, he asked 
instead, were photographs used? Coming from a member of the department of 
philosophy at Harvard within which pragmatism took root (planted by Peirce, over-
watered by James), his question might at first glance seem to have been a commonplace 
rejection of the biases toward ontological and epistemological enquiry prevailing 
elsewhere. Santayana, however, was to subject his pragmatic query to a two-fold 
historical refinement anticipating not only how Austin and Wittgenstein would later 
 
essays selected and translated by Hugh Grey (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of 
California Press, 1967). [Originally published in French as essays: 1958-1965]. Siegfried Kracauer, 
From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1947). Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology 
of Film, enlarged edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979). [Originally 
published in 1971.] 
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recommend that philosophers constrain themselves when trying to answer the 
questions they ask but going beyond even Collingwood's correction of it. 
 
Santayana, recognising that we can both use and misuse tools, narrowed the question 
historically, rendering it philosophically enlightening. Rather then asking how 
connoisseurs of photography had tried of late to adapt its tools to 'artistic' purposes, 
Santayana asked how cameras and photographs had been used early on before makers 
and users became self-conscious about it – how, that is, had common folk used cameras 
and photographs to achieve the commonplace ends to which those tools were naturally 
suited? 
 
His answer, of course, was that the tools of photography had in the first instance been 
used, as they are even now most commonly used, to create portraits of family and 
friends that enable us 'to see how they had looked'. Unlike creative artistic objects used 
to help us to remember how things had looked or to imagine how they might or could 
have looked, photographs have always been used principally as 'substitutes for the 
mental image' enabling us to see how things had looked in the past without having to 
remember or imagine them, just as we see how things around us look without having to 
remember or imagine them.  
 
Santayana was aware that most photographers then and thereafter would wish to 
produce beautiful photographs, and he applauded their ambition. He indeed urged his 
listeners to welcome whatever technological advances might someday enable us by 
means of photographs to see even more beautifully how things look (the invention of 
colour film stocks, for example), for the refinements might well permit unprecedented 
artistic achievements.11  
 
Santayana coupled his encouragement of photographic artistry, however, with a 
stringent warning. If photographers, when searching for beauty, were to avoid aping 
impotently how other artists worked, they would have to ensure that they were using 
their distinctive tools distinctively – using them, that is, as a means to the ends natural 
to them. Beauty in photography, unlike in painting, for example, would forever be linked 
by the nature of the photographical tools to the beauty of the objects photographed 
and hence predominantly to the selection and arrangement of them, for how beautiful 
 
11 Filmmakers in particular will appreciate how sensitive Santayana was to the working 
scope and nature of the tools of photography, and hence how historically apt his admonitions 
were to prove, unlike the counsels to the contrary of his colleague Münsterberg a decade or so 
later when insisting that filmmakers, to work 'artistically', must show things as 'unrealistically' as 
possible. See Hugo Münsterberg, The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (New York, New York: D. 
Appleton, 1916). 
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objects looked before the camera would continue to determine how beautiful they 
appeared to us by means of the photograph.12 
 
Santayana was insisting to his listeners that they could come to understand how 
photographs might better to be made only by acknowledging how they had once been 
made – only, that is, by recollecting how working photographers had once made 
photographs for ordinary use before the sensitivities of some of them had become 
blunted by the temptation to misconstrue their art as 'creative' rather than 'imitative'.13  
 
To ascertain how things were once used, however, requires, as Collingwood would later 
insist, estimations of intent.14 Intentions with respect to photographs, however, as with 
all things, can only be recaptured from within a precise description of how we speak of 
them when putting them to use, as Austin and Wittgenstein would later affirm. Had 
Santayana gone on to construe how we speak ordinarily of photographs as symptomatic 
of how we use them uniquely, he would have prefigured the later programme of 
"linguistic phenomenology" (Austin's phrase).15  
 
Santayana avoided doing so, however, and he was right to avoid it, for, besides wishing 
to return the attention of his audience to the working uses of things as the pragmatists 
 
12 Artists wishing their works to last must work hard to ensure that they merit revisiting, 
and mastering the craft of the art consists in larger part of learning how to do it. We reattend to 
works of the non-photographical arts by revisiting the works themselves. As Santayana sensed, 
however, we reattend to photographical works by revisiting not only the photographs 
themselves but the objects photographed that reappear to us by means of them. Experiencing 
works of photographical art entails a 'two-fold revisitation' distinguishing it from how we 
experience works of art of other kinds. 
13 Two decades later, René Clair would caution filmmakers against the same temptation, 
reminding them that "The principal task of the present generation should be to restore the 
cinema to what it was at the outset and, in order to do that, to rid it of all the false art that is 
smothering it." (Clair was referring specifically to the loss of motion in films, but the sentiment 
applies beyond it.) René Clair. Cinema: Yesterday and Today, translated by Stanley Appelbaum 
and edited with an Introduction and Annotations by R. C. Dale (New York: Dover Publications, 
1972), page 35. [French edition, 1970.] Reprint in part of unidentified text, probably from 
"Conférence de Monsieur René Clair", Cinémagazine 4 (05 December 1924), pages 420-422. 
14 R. G. Collingwood says so most succinctly and provocatively in his An Autobiography 
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1970 [1939]), notably within Chapter V, "Question 
and Answer", pages 29-43. 
15 "For this reason I think it might be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, 
some less misleading name than those given above – for instance, 'linguistic phenomenology', 
only that is rather a mouthful." J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses". Reprinted from the Proceedings 
of the Aristotelean Society, 1956-57, as Chapter 6, pages 123-152 of Philosophical Papers 
(Oxford, England: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1961). The quotation is from page 130. 
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would have done, he had a broader historical claim to make whose especial relevance to 
philosophical enquiry only Austin, with his respect for the Darwinian evolution of 
language, might have sensed.16 And he staked his claim up front! 
 
 
… at the Very Beginning 
 
Santayana began his address by reminding his audience, through an extended Darwinian 
recounting of the evolutionary trajectory of living things within the encompassing 
history of the world, of the crucial importance of our having become able to remember 
things (able, that is, to retain and reuse what he called 'mental images' of them). He 
recognised how odd this opening would seem to an audience having come to hear him 
speak of photography and remarked upon it.  
 
Why, then, did he begin his talk with a short lecture on remembering in the context of 
the long history of evolution? Because he was convinced that the remarks that he was 
to make about photography, contrasting its earlier with its later uses, would be useful 
only if understood historically. Santayana recognised, as Collingwood would later affirm, 
that affirmations are meaningful only when construed as answers to questions, that 
questions can be understood only as asked within their historical (working) context and 
that coming to understand anything within its historical context is a never-ending, open-
ended task.  
 
To comprehend the photographical arts, one had therefore to register in historical 
context how photographs had once been used before the temptation to employ the 
tools of photography 'creatively' had cluttered their distinctively 'imitative' use, recalling 
in particular how before photography one could only remember how things had 'looked' 
by invoking 'mental images' of them, whereas afterwards one could see again and again 
how they had 'looked' by using photographs naturally as substitutes for the 'mental 
images' no longer required. 
 
Santayana's excursion into the vistas of prehistory was therefore an apt introduction not 
only to what he had to say but to how he had to say it and hence exemplary of how 
philosophy could better to be done. Consequently, we may learn from his address not 
only how better to think about photography, as did his audience on that evening so long 
 
16 "… our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth 
drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many 
generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up 
to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and 
reasonably practical matters, than any you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an 
afternoon – the most favoured alternative method." Ibid, page 130. 
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ago, but, in keeping with his anticipatory broadening of Collingwood's implicit correction 
of the ahistorical programme of Austin and Wittgenstein, how better to think of that 
programme itself. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Santayana's story was, as he suggested, "not without importance". It remains for me, 
indeed, among the most important stories that he ever told. Why, then, did he refrain 
from publishing it? When did he delete its final four pages? Why did he find them 
unsatisfactory? 
 
To ask these questions, of course, is to play an historical game of cards with a half-
empty deck. Publication could easily have been precluded for reasons and causes no 
longer traceable, and ready avenues of publication for remarks about a subject so 
seemingly unimportant yet so intensively addressed would long remain unavailable. 
Besides, Santayana had other things on his mind, working as he was upon the first of 
two four-volume sets of philosophical ponderings that would eventually earn him the 
sobriquet of having been a 'systematic philosopher'.17 
 
It seems likely to me, however, that reasons more complex compound the picture, and 
that the missing four pages of his otherwise intact manuscript point toward them. 
 
Santayana prided himself on having 'never read a logic book in his life'. Unlike many who 
have read a good many of them, however, he remained throughout his life unusually 
sensitive to gaps in arguments that others had failed to sense or in bluster disregarded. I 
suspect, therefore that Santayana, incapable of pretense with respect to his own works 
as well, sensed upon rethinking his remarks about the use of photography and its 
consequences that what he had said and how he had said it resonated far more deeply 
than he had realised, rendering the 'conclusion' of his text inappropriate and requiring a 
significant rethinking of the philosophical implications of prior pages were they to fit 
within the more encompassing accounts of ourselves and our world upon which he was 
working.18 Convinced of the 'importance' of what he had said before concluding his 
remarks, he cleaved off the final four pages of the manuscript while preserving the 
remainder, hoping at some later date to see his way over, under or around the logical 
perplexity that he sensed within respect to it. 
 
17 See page 5, footnote 7, above. 
18 How in particular could the matter and method of his remarks on photography be 
reconciled with those upon which he was working with respect to the notions of 'essence' 
'matter', 'truth' and 'spirit' that would later be published as Realms of Being? 
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If so, Santayana's unfinished manuscript may well signal a growing awareness on his 
part that his remarks had been so sweeping in form and substance that no summary of 
their consequences could be given; for, despite his lack of expertise as a photographer, 
he had sensed and affirmed within his address the fundamental difference between the 
photographical and other arts that many in his audience, though more expert 
photographically, had forgotten. 
  
The photographical arts are arts of reappearance. 
  
Photographers can enable viewers of a photograph to see the objects that stood before 
the camera during 'the act of creation' that produced it – a seeing that viewers can no 
more doubt credibly than they can doubt seeing the photograph or other objects about 
 
Even more striking,  however, is how differently Santayana drew attention to the 
distinction – a difference as prescient as what he said of it.  
 
Rather than arguing for the merits of his claim, he instead rendered the 
distinction obvious to his listeners by reminding them through examples of what 
they already knew but were in danger of forgetting, namely how photographs 
had been used before photographers became self-conscious about the making of 
them. 
 
Santayana's 'method' of provoking his audience to 'recollect' through 'examples' what 
they already knew of photography is of a piece with Austin and Wittgenstein's later 
insistence with respect to philosophy that we can learn of it only by reminding ourselves 
and others though examples of how words are used.19 Small wonder that his address 
 
19 See, for example, Wittgenstein's remarks that "The work of the philosopher consists 
in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.". and "Learning philosophy is really 
recollecting. We remember that we really did use words that way.". Quotations from section 89 
of "Philosophy", sections 86-93 of The Big Typescript TS213: German-Scholars' Edition [from 
original typescripts 1933-1937], edited and translated by C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A. 
E. Aue (Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pages 306e and 309e. See also Austin's 
remarks, page 10, footnote 16, above. Santayana and Wittgenstein were each in his own way 
and perhaps unwittingly echoing Socrates (see Plato's Meno). A decade or so after Santayana's 
address on photography, he was to suggest as well that "Logic is a refined form of grammar", 
hinting again how attuned he was with 'his mind's ear', though with earlier equipment, to the 
same philosophical frequencies that Austin and Wittgenstein would later amplify. See George 
Santayana, Realms of Being ['One Volume Edition with a New Introduction by the Author'] (New 
York, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942 [incorporating material published as early as 
1927]), page 439. 
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with its 'method of examples' was to prove beyond comprehension to the few 
philosophers known to me who have bothered to ponder it, a response comparable in 
kind to the puzzlement provoked later within many of them by the 'method' of Austin 
and Wittgenstein – and of Collingwood in particular, insisting to almost total disregard 
that 'examples', even when philosophical, must be rooted historically before they can be 
registered as significant.20   
 
20  Even as I write, commentators lacking a working acquaintance with the constraints 
within which photographers and filmmakers must work, and hence attuned insufficiently to the 
logical niceties of them, continue to presuppose that Santayana's remarks and 'method' when 
addressing the Harvard Camera Club were imprecise, careless or worse, among them Irving 
Singer, an otherwise sympathetic reader of his works and the only author known to me to have 
remarked at length thereafter them (see his "Santayana and the Ontology of the Photographic 
Image", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Fall, 1977), pages 39-43, and 
his later reformulation of its argument in Part 1, Chapter 1, pages 30f, of his Reality 
Transformed: Film as Meaning and Technique. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998).  
Robin Collingwood himself wrote the best introduction to how the 'method of examples' 
must be construed to be viable. See his An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1939). 
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Appendix 
 
Excerpts from George Santayana's 
"The Photograph and the Mental Image"  
[1900-1907]21 
 
 
I hardly know if I have done right in coming to address you here, where in my 
ignorance of photography I ought rather to be a listener: yet however little one 
may know of photography, no one can now-a-days be ignorant of photographs. 
They fill our rooms, shops and journals; they even take the place of actors upon 
the stage, and repeat for us with the movement of life whatever interesting 
scenes are being enacted in any part of the world. And people in their travels 
now carry a double sensorium about with them, and a double memory, one in 
their heads and another in a little black box slung over the shoulder. It is of this 
increase in human faculty, and of the way in which this artificial eye and 
memory fill out our natural experience, that I wish to speak to you this evening: 
and it seems to me a subject not without importance. (page 391) 
 
There are not wanting other animals, however [higher on the evolutionary scale 
than 'the microbes and the sponges'; added EWC], for whom a shock strong 
enough to be felt is not necessarily strong enough to be fatal; the shock can 
then serve to call forth during life that prophetic power of intelligence which, as 
we fancied, might be aroused even in the dullest animals by the conflict with 
death. A shock may impress without quite destroying, and the accompanying 
sense of something external may endure for a while and furnish a wholly new 
element to the contents of the mind. 
 
This new element is perception – the consciousness of objects among which we 
move and on which we react with various degrees of pleasure and profit. 
Perception gives the mind the picture of a world, at the same time that it 
denotes an adjustment of the body to its real environment. The mental image is 
at once the sign of a practical adaptation to things and the spiritual reward of 
that adaptation. Our ideas are symbols of a more far-reaching sensitiveness in 
our organism – of its better protection against surprise and death – and they 
have value also on their own account, because they are an interesting and not 
insignificant development of consciousness, which by them comes to build up a 
 
21 I append these excerpts from Santayana's manuscript of his address to enable readers 
to catch firsthand something of the extraordinary scope and manner of his achievement within 
it. See page 5, footnote 6, above for the citation to the only published edition of his talk, never 
reissued, from which these excepts are drawn. Bracketed interpolations, unless otherwise 
noted, are Santayana's own. 
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world of discourse and to escape ideally (by interest in the forms it evokes) from 
brutish absorption in nutritive and individual processes. For the form of an idea 
can appear in one mind after another and is essentially eternal, just as the 
matter of bodies passes from one body to another and survives them all. 
 
The mental image already carries us, therefore, from the animal to the spiritual 
sphere – to the sphere of practical wisdom and free speculation. But perception, 
however useful and enlightening for the moment, would not do us much service 
if it could not be revived upon occasion … The organism must not only react 
upon objects, it must react upon them regularly. Reflex action must settle down 
into instinct. So too the mental image becomes important chiefly by becoming 
permanent. To acquire conscious experience we must be able to retain past 
images and compare them with their successors, just as to attain practical skill 
we must keep open those cerebral paths which were cut and cleared by our first 
training. (pages 393 and 394) 
 
Now, it happens that the body's memory is better than the mind's. The paths 
between act and act, the paths of habit and reflex action are better preserved 
than the paths between idea and idea; or rather, the connections between 
associated excitements are easier to revive than are the complete excitements 
themselves. … We can accordingly act in virtue of much experience which we 
have forgotten, and the fruits of learning are not so ephemeral as learning itself. 
The upper strata of the brain, on which our thoughts and images are grafted, 
would seem to be of an inconceivably subtle texture, and the thousand 
vibrations that constantly sweep through that gossamer web, tear and tangle 
the threads into a mesh, from which it is hard to pull out anything whole. 
Nothing can be repeated with exactness in the fancy, nothing accepted with 
literalness, nothing retained without accretion. The new is coloured by the old, 
the old overlaid and distorted by the new. And, what is worse, the greater part 
of the experiences which fill a life are lost irretrievably – although their lesson 
and influence may remain – because the brain, in spite of its prodigious 
complexity, has no room for so many impressions, has not signals and wires and 
energy enough for so many successive messages, for so many exact revivals of 
experience, as a perfect memory would require. Therefore, although everything 
in the physical world seems to us at times to change quickly enough, everything 
physical is stable in comparison with the absolute instability of images in the 
mind. They cannot be retained unchanged for an instant, nor recalled 
unchanged at any subsequent time. 
 
This absolute flux of mental images is annoying in life and melancholy in 
reflection. To be sure, those images do not make up the best part of the mind 
nor the kernel of our individuality: if they did, we should not be able to lament 
their flight, which we should ourselves accompany. There is something 
comparatively permanent in us that takes note of mutation and is the standard 
of celerity. There are instincts and ideals and intelligible truths which make a 
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background for that flux of sensibility. … But just because we and our interests 
endure, we lament the lapse of those vivid perceptions which have been the 
filling of our lives, the material, as it were, of our being. We survive them with a 
certain sense of emptiness and futility, as if we were surviving ourselves. … 
Hence we are glad when some chance encounter rekindles old memories, and 
makes Richard himself again. We are grateful to any art which restores that 
sensuous filling of experience, which was its most lively and substantial part in 
passing, but which now is so hopelessly past. 
 
And this – for I come at last to our main subject – precisely this is the function of 
photography. The eye has only one retina, the brain a limited capacity for 
storage; but the camera can receive any number of plates, and the new need 
never blur nor crowd out the old. Here is a new and accurate visual memory, a 
perfect record of that the brain must necessarily forget or confuse. Here is an 
art that truly imitates the given nature, in the proper meaning of this much-
abused phrase, – an art that carries on in the spirit of nature, but with another 
organ, functions which the given nature imperfectly performs. Photography 
imitates memory, so that it's product, the photograph, carries out the function 
imperfectly fulfilled by the mental image. The virtue of photography is to 
preserve the visible semblance of interesting things so that the memory of them 
may be fixed or accurately restored. (pages 394 and 396) 
 
 … those ancient and magnificent inventions of speech and writing helped 
human memory to retain only those things which the understanding had 
already worked over: they recorded and transmitted the intelligible, the 
describable, what had passed through the processes of abstraction and verbal 
expression: our humbler art of photography has come to help us in the weakest 
part of our endowment, to rescue from oblivion the most fleeting portion of our 
experience – the momentary vision, the irrevocable mental image. 
 
That this is the function of photography is made clear by the use to which it was 
first put. Photography was first employed in portraiture; that is, it was first 
employed to preserve those mental images which we most dislike to lose, the 
images of familiar faces. (page 396) 
 
Portraits are no longer the only product of photography. The technique of the 
art has of late so much improved that it can be turned to many other uses. It 
now renders for us not only monuments and works of other arts, but every 
aspect of life in its instantaneous truth. … I do not how you may feel, but I 
confess that in cutting the pages of a magazine – and I never cut them unless 
they are illustrated – it is only the photographs that really interest me: the 
drawings are seldom the work of a hand that, in Michael Angelo's phrase, obeys 
an intellect; they are usually feeble and sketchy representatives of the fact and 
still more feeble representatives of the ideal. The photographs, on the other 
hand, are truly graphic; there is the unalloyed fact; there is what you would go 
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to see if you had wings and an infinite circle of acquaintance; there is the proof 
that all they tell us about China or South Africa is no myth, but that men on two 
legs walk about there, looking quite recognisably human, caught in the act and 
gesture of life, in spite of their strange surroundings and peculiar gear. With 
such objects before me, I open my eyes. I look with the same inevitable 
interests as if the whole procession of life were passing under my windows. The 
sophisticated concern about art sinks before the spontaneous love of reality, 
and I thank the photography for being so transparent a vehicle for things and 
sparing me, in my acquaintance with remote fact, the [untrustworthy and] 
impertinent medium of a reporting mind. 
 
Henceforth history need not be a prosy tome in fine print without illustrations: 
posterity will know of us not merely what we did and thought, but how we 
looked and what we saw. The reportable outline of events will be filled in with 
the material of sense, faithfully preserved and easily communicated. Even as it 
is, the remnants of graphic arts of antiquity give us the most vivid notion we can 
have of those times; yet those works betray rather than depict the age that 
produced them, for they were meant for objects of worship or were at any rate 
largely predetermined by traditional mannerisms, by symbolic conventions, and 
by the love of absolute beauty. If such ideal works, surviving by accident and in 
small numbers, yet vivify for us the records of past time, how much more 
illuminating will be those innumerable reproductions of everything that 
surrounds and interests us, direct reproductions uninfluenced by any human 
bias other than that shown in the selection of their subjects! As students of 
zoology put on their slides infinitely fine and numerous sections of the 
specimens they study, so the photographer can furnish for the instruction of 
posterity infinitely fine and numerous cross-sections of the present world of 
men. (pages 397 and 398) 
 
But perhaps I am not saying what you expected to hear; and it may seem that in 
my praises of photography I miss the main point, and say nothing about its 
latest successes and its highest ambitions. Cannot photographs be beautiful? Is 
not photography a branch of fine art? Cannot the impression of a sunset, 
snapped at the right moment on the right day and printed on the right paper 
with reagents of the right variety, have all the sweep and subtlety of a Turner? 
Cannot a model's head be so posed and lighted that the result will wonderfully 
resemble a Rembrandt or a Holbein? Yes, and there is no limit that I know of to 
the progress which photography may make in these directions. … Natural 
science may find in the processes of photography applications no less brilliant 
than it finds in mechanical arts: and I fully expect to find colour and permanence 
and many unthought of perfections soon added to those which good 
photographs already have. And while the processes of the art are being 
perfected, the experience and taste of photographers may also grow: the more 
they are masters of their art the better they will know what objects gain most 
by photography, what lights and what poses are permanently pleasing, and 
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what treatment and retouching can be occasionally helpful. The resources of 
invention in arranging models can increase indefinitely, and also the tact in 
catching the beautiful aspects of cloud, mountain and sea. But when we speak 
of coordinating photography with the fine arts, we must beware of confusion. 
There is no occasion to be niggardly in the use of pleasant words, and since the 
word art has in some circles a sacramental value, we may gladly use it to 
describe any ingenious process by which man produces things which by their 
use or beauty are delightful to him. And, in a genuine sense, the taking and 
developing of a photograph requires art; and this art, being governed by a 
desire for beauty and being productive of beautiful things, may well be called a 
fine art. For fine art is usually said to be distinguished from useful art by having 
beauty for its chief aim and the love of beauty of its chief inspiration. 
 
But a wide use of words, legitimate if it is inevitable or if it gives anybody 
pleasure, should not be allowed to blind us to important distinctions in things: 
and while photography is surely an art and its products are often beautiful, 
there remains a deep and quite unbridgeable chasm between it and that other 
kind of art whose essence is not so much to mirror or reproduce the outer 
aspect of things, however bewitching, as to create in imitation of the processes 
of Nature, but in different materials, things analogous to the natural. These 
products of creative art are shadows rather than replicas of reality and present 
things as they could never have actually existed: men of stone, passions that 
obey the rules of prosody, heart-throbs that keep time with an orchestra, 
tragedies that unravel themselves in five acts without irrelevant incidents – in a 
word, substitutes for reality that transform it into the materially impossible, in 
order to bring it within the sphere of the persuasive and the divine. (pages 398-
399) 
 
In order to touch creative art of this sort, it is not enough to produce beautiful 
things, else the gardener no less than the photographer would be a creative 
artist; the gardener also watches his opportunity, training and guiding his 
natural engine, the plant, to desirable issues. And the gardener, too, is no 
utilitarian, but exists wholly in the service of beauty. Indeed, if some voluptuary 
should walk about the earth choosing none but the pleasant places and refusing 
to lift his eyes on anything but the beautiful, and should studiously keep in his 
mind's album nothing but images of beautiful things – he would not be a 
creative artist; his art of opportune perception and enchanted memory would 
have weakened his energies without producing anything of spiritual value to 
himself or to the world. And what would have been lacking in that luxurious 
passivity? Surely the humane reaction, the selective glance that neglects what it 
despises in order to extricate and remodel what it loves. What constitutes ideal 
art, then, is the making of something over under the guidance of a human 
interest. What issues from any process not guided by a human impulse cannot 
have ideal value, even if that process went on in the camera obscura of a 
passive and indolent brain. (pages 399 and 400) 
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"Now a photograph is produced by a machine, just as the images of fancy and 
memory are reproduced by a machine; both the camera and the brain 
transform their impressions in many ways, but not as a moral and conscious 
interest would transform them. The accidental transformations of the image in 
photography and memory are consequently defects and imperfections, while 
the intentional transformations of ideal art are beauties. For the function of 
photographs and of mental images is to revive experience, but the function of 
creative art is to interpret experience. Creative art must transform the object, in 
order to tell us something more about it. For an interpretation that merely 
repeated the identical terms of its text would be a laughable and stupid thing. 
Yet just this literal repetition makes the success of an art whose function is 
revival. Why you ask a man to explain his words, it is an insult if he merely 
repeats them; when you ask him to repeat his words, he is a fool if he sets about 
to explain them. So when I ask a photograph to come to the succour of my weak 
memory and visual imagination, and to tell me how things look, I do not want 
that photograph to be retouched or blurred or idealized; and when I ask a poet 
to tell me what his passions meant, I do not wish him to inform me of the time 
of day or of the colours of the rainbow. There is one art to focus and revive 
experience, there is another art to digest and absorb it. The is an artificial 
memory, the other a petrified intelligence. (page 400) 
 
Accordingly it seems to me that a profound misunderstanding lurks in the 
criticism often made of photography, that it is crude and literal. Its defects are 
the exact opposite: namely, that as yet it cannot reproduce our visual sensations 
without subtracting something from their colour and motion, without dropping 
something of their stimulating and instructive power. When photography 
becomes perfect, all our visual experience will be revivable at will – and this 
would be a truly miraculous triumph over mortal limitations, won, as all 
triumphs are won, by docility to the facts and laws of the real world. To 
complain of a photograph for being literal and merciless, is like complaining of a 
good memory that will not suffer you to forget your sins. A good memory is a 
good thing for a good man, and to admit all the facts is the beginning of 
salvation. So with the contemplation of Nature and man; a genuine love of mere 
perception, a clear vision of things as they are, is the necessary condition of 
artistic power or of critical capacity. Photography is useful to the artist because 
it helps him to see and to keep seeing, and helpful to every intelligent man 
because it enables him to see much that from his station in space and time, is 
naturally invisible. To be accurate and complete is therefore the ideal of 
photography, as of memory: an ideal which is not the less genuine because it is 
not absolutely realisable and not the less worth because, even if it could be 
realised, it would still leave room for other and higher things. For a virtue of 
subordinate things, when they are genuine, is to remain subordinate. If memory 
were perfectly developed it would not prevent us from imagining all sorts of 
possible and yet unrealized things: on the contrary it would furnish the mind 
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with clearer and more numerous analogies for its invention to follow, and keep 
its ideals from being childish and irrelevant. So too the prevalence of 
photography will not tend to kill the impulse to design, but rather stimulate and 
train it by focussing attention on that natural structure of things by which all 
beautiful design is inspired. (page 401) 
 
The same misunderstanding which occasions this reproach of literalness 
addressed to photography, is the cause also of a mistaken ambition on its part – 
the ambition to be ideal [a very different thing, I need hardly say, from the 
ambition to be beautiful]. For good photographs will be beautiful when their 
object is beautiful and poetical when their object is poetical; but to be ideal they 
would have to transform the object so as to make it a clearer response to the 
observer's predetermined interests. The camera cannot have a human bias, it 
cannot exercise a selective attention or be guided by an imaginative impulse: it 
will do its honest work in an honest way. Therefore the sentimental 
photographer is driven to manipulate the model, to try to give it an interesting 
expression, to make it smile or bend or dress up to resemble something ideal 
which he has seen upon the stage or in the works of the old masters. The art of 
photography is thus superposed, as it were, on the art of posing, and the new 
interest which the photograph acquires is the somewhat meretricious interest 
of the living picture it represents. No, that is a false ambition; and whoever is 
seriously tempted by it ought to abandon photography altogether, take pen or 
pencil in hand, and train himself to the production of things not seen by the 
retina not transferable to a plate, but visible only to the imagination and not to 
be rendered except by a hand miraculously obedient to the intellect. (pages 401 
and 402)  
 
Yet, while we may fail to see any genuine affinity between photography and 
creative art, we need not share that supercilious attitude towards reality and its 
photographic image, which is affected by some votaries of the imagination. 
Imagination is a good thing, but it is a substitute for vision which would be 
better. And while photography can never have the spiritual value, the pathetic 
and humane meaning of creative art, that real world and that natural beauty 
which photography reproduces have always been, are now, and ever will be the 
ultimate object of human interest. The real world is the subject of creative art; it 
is what the true artist is himself in love with. If you meet a poet who is more 
interested in his own verses – or in any verses – than in what inspired them; if 
you meet a painter who cares more for his art than for his perceptions, or a 
sculpture who delights more in statues than in moving and living forms – set 
him down without hesitation for a sham. Art is secondary, life and perception 
are primary; since it is only the fascination exercised over us by real things that 
can suggest to us the possibility of their ideal perfection: and if we hasten to 
render this ideal perfection in some artificial medium, and are enraptured even 
by the dead suggestion of a complete beauty, how much more must we desire 
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that complete beauty itself, as Nature or a better life might some day actually 
produce it! (page 402) 
 
… we must not think that it [creative art] excels in potential dignity that reality 
which it transmutes into an appearance, in order to reduce it more easily to a 
human scale. We should rather admit creative art as the best mediator between 
our half-lighted minds and our half-tamed environment – as a medium through 
which these two can communicate in their primitive estrangement. Yet, to help 
us bridge that chasm, we should welcome any mechanical arts which, like 
photography, improve and extend our perceptions, helping us to see and to 
remember; for by such means the real world may be made clearer and more 
familiar to us – that real world from which all beauty is derived and in which all 
beautiful forms, if they could have their way, would be ultimately embodied. 
(page 403) 
 
 
 
